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In this article I analyse how Georgia, as a political entity, coped with the de facto loss of two of its 
territories: Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The process by which Georgia lost these territories started in 
early 1990 and reached its final phase in 2008 after the Georgian-Russian war.  This article explores how 
Georgia adjusted to these losses without ever acknowledging its loss of the two territories, demonstrating a 
perfect example on how the normative territorial structure of an international system works. The analysis 
focuses on the crucial role of time in the process of the de facto territorial changes and examines how 
Georgia, in adapting to territorial losses and through its own actions, actually strengthened its separation 
from Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
Keywords: borders, territory, de facto states, international recognition, Georgia, Abkhazia, South 
Ossetia.
INTRODUCTION
Two weeks after the August 2008 Georgian-Russian war, Russia recognised the independence 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  The President of the Russian Federation at the time, Dimitry 
Medvedev, made a public statement explaining that Russia had no choice but to help the 
threatened population of these two territories; recognising the territories as independent 
from Georgia, said Medvedev, was the only way to help and secure them (Медведев, 2008). 
This decision transformed Georgia.  Georgia’s “frozen” territorial conflict situation, which for 
a short time had become “hot,” evolved into a situation in which Georgia faced two separatist 
entities supported by a powerful state. 
Georgia’s territorial conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia began in the early 1990s when, 
after two wars, Georgia lost control of both territories. Although efforts to solve the conflicts had 
been implemented, neither side managed to find a viable solution (Cornell, 2002; George, 2009; 
Souleimanov, 2013). For a very long time, Georgians did not have any clear plans for solving the 
conflicts and keeping the territories within the state, as any concessions, or so it was perceived, 
would have only demonstrated Georgia’s weakness. Later, the elites of the separatist territories 
grew increasingly unabashed in claiming the right, for their respective people and territories, to 
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establish sovereign states. Around the turn of the century, the negotiations almost stopped and 
observers started to refer to the conflicts as “frozen.” The conflicts remained in this unresolved 
condition until the Georgian-Russian war of 2008 and the ensuing Russian recognition of the 
territories (Asmus, 2010; Coppieters, 2012; Cornell and Starr, 2009). 
Since 2008, Abkhazia and South Ossetia intensified their state-building efforts and began 
implementing a variety of state practices, such as strengthening ministries, building social 
services, and formulating their own foreign and security policies. Both of the formerly Georgian 
entities signed friendship treaties with Russia, established agreements regarding assistance in 
guarding their borders; and in 2015 Abkhazia signed a Partnership treaty with Russia and South 
Ossetia signed an Integration treaty with Russia. Both South Ossetia and Abkhazia have regular 
parliamentary and presidential elections (these elections are not observed) and seem to be 
functioning like so-called normal states—and yet they are not normal states. Aside from Russia, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia are currently recognised only by three other states: Nicaragua, 
Venezuela, and Nauru. So, Abkhazia and South Ossetia lack an essential element of sovereign 
statehood—international recognition. 
In academic literature, entities like Abkhazia and South Ossetia are referred to as de facto 
states (Caspersen, 2012; Pegg, 1998; Yemelianova, 2015). De facto states have more or less all of 
the characteristics of a state except one: international recognition by a majority of the states (UN 
members). The main quandary for de facto states is that they cannot go back to their previous 
status and live within the state they want to separate from, nor can they become a legitimate 
part of the international society. Usually, three criteria define de facto states: 1) they possess 
de facto independence, including territorial control, and have maintained such independence 
for at least two years; 2) They lack widespread international recognition (though sometimes 
some members of the international community grant de facto states recognition); and 3) They 
demonstrate aspirations for full, de jure independence through referendums or a declaration 
of independence that reveal a clear desire for a separate existence (Caspersen and Stansfield, 
2011, pp. 3–4). As Abkhazia and South Ossetia both satisfy this criteria, they are usually are 
deemed de facto states in recent academic literature (Yemelianova, 2015). 
Georgia considers the separatist efforts of Abkhazia and South Ossetia violations of its 
territorial integrity and Georgian officials are careful not to make any moves that would imply 
recognition of either entity. In this article, I want to demonstrate how Georgia, in growing 
accustomed to its new and smaller territory without ever acknowledging its loss of the separatist 
territories, is a perfect example of how the normative territorial structure of the international 
system works. To demonstrate this, I focus on how Georgia’s adaptation to living without two 
part of its territory occurred and how time served as a crucial factor in allowing the de facto 
territorial changes to take place.
The driving force in the development of Georgia’s conflicts with Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
has been establishing territorial control, and the current and most visible state-building practices 
of the de facto states concentrate on territorial and bordering practices. Thus, in the first part 
of the article, I define the role of territory, territoriality, and borders in the contemporary state 
system. In the second part, I explain international recognition practices—they impose the 
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structural limitations that allow or prevent new states to appear in the international arena. In 
the third part, I analyse the borderisation that has been taking place in Georgia since 2013—this 
process entails the creation of a border regime between Georgia and its separatist territories. 
In the fourth part, I analyse Georgia’s policies regarding the separatist regions and demonstrate 
their contradictory nature. Finally, I explain how Georgia’s practices and the habitual nature 
of international relations stabilise territorial divisions and strengthen the de facto statehood 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
1. TERRITORIALLITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM
The characteristics of modern territoriality noted by many researchers are its obviousness and 
stability (Agnew, 1994; Elden, 2013; Gregory, 1994; O’Tuathail, 1996); these researchers analyse 
the historicity of the modern concept of territory and emphasise its modern roots. Modern 
territoriallity and statehood are inherently linked: the state controls the space of a particular 
territory and the territory of the state defines the control of violence over that state and its 
population. Foucault has noted that although territory is a geographical term, it is first and 
foremost a juridico-political concept, in that it defines the area controlled by certain power 
(Foucault, 2007, p. 176).
So, the modern world is envisioned as a world territorially and exclusively divided into 
sovereign states. The state system is self-sustaining and self-referential; it exists through the 
mutual recognition of its subjects. The territoriality of statehood is a fundamental feature of 
statehood, so the identity of the state is inevitably territorial, and thus sets limits as lines drawn 
between the state and the other to describe its place in the world. When analysing territorial 
subjects that want to be recognised as states but lack statehood recognition, this perceived 
simplicity by which territory is defined serves as a starting point for defining their subjectivity. 
John Agnew has famously discussed the territorial trap—the condition of the modern 
international system (Agnew, 1994). The metaphor of the territorial trap emphasises the 
concentration of political power in sovereign territorial units and the automatism of experts 
when they talk about problems in international relations. According to Agnew, the territorial 
trap relies on three assumptions: 1) The sovereign has an exclusive right to certain territory, 
which is embodied in a state; 2) The state has absolute sovereignty of its territory; and 3) The 
state’s survival depends on its ability to survive and control its territory.
The second assumption states that two separate, distinct spaces—internal and external—
exist. There are two different games played in two spaces, and they are clearly delineated. 
Agnew asserts that this assumption focuses mostly on the horizontal dimension of power and 
ignores the verticality of the territory. The third assumption states that the borders of the state 
(should) coincide with the borders of the society; this means the state is a “container” for the 
society to live within.
Agnew criticises these assumptions, his goal is to open the discipline of human geography. 
However, in this article, I propose treating these assumptions as recommendations, as devices 
that indicate what a self-containing sovereign state in modern international relations should 
seek and what strategies it should carry out. De facto states need to be trapped by territoriality 
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to designate distinctions between “inside” and “outside” and to persuade others that their 
containers are the best for their societies. The normative ideal of the sovereign state is clear, 
and so are the goals for achieving sovereignty. 
The distinguishing feature of de facto states is their lack of international recognition. To 
compensate for this deficiency, they need to fulfil as many other criteria of statehood as possible. 
Thus, this also means they have to create a political territoriality that becomes indistinguishable 
from that of the so-called true states. They have not only to use the discourses of the state, 
they have to practice territoriality and bordering.
Borders could also be perceived as clear and stable lines on delimiting the start of a state’s 
territories. Accepting Agnew’s proposition about traps and not seeing the territory of the state 
as an obvious and secured container, the border analysis is no longer self-evident. We must 
analyse borders not in relation to something or someone (Green, 2013), but with a focus on 
the border itself, by asking what it does in becoming and being a border.
A border is not simply an object or an entity, but a process. And it is a continuous process at 
that, a border has to be constantly enacted in order to stay viable and create entities, events, 
and objects. For example, the border-crossing practice does not have meaning without the 
concept of borders. Changes in border regimes also reclassify the spaces they separate (Parker 
and Adler-Nissen, 2012, p. 778). So, borders also become knowledge practices. Borders define 
and explain the world; and as Foucault has asserted, they are inseparable from the execution 
of power.
How do political borders contribute to and make possible the specific conceptualisation 
of a space? This question is about border regimes, which are the system of various practices 
that sustain the idea of a border and support the territoriality of the state. The answer to this 
question can be found by examining particular empirical practices at and around borders and 
border technologies—the constitutive process of building a border, or bordering. First among 
these empirical practices is the actual creation of a border (by either demarcating it with signs, 
or by physically building something material, such as a wall, to indicate the border). Bordering 
practices can also be, and often are, indirect (e.g., erasing a border with a union treaty, building 
signposts and placing them in border zones, monitoring a border with surveillance technologies, 
or controlling movement across a border with visa regimes, citizenship regimes and so forth). 
Stuart Elden discusses the technologies of the territory and broadens the concept of the 
regime by including such governance techniques as juridical justifications, political debates 
and theories, colonial processes and conquests, and historical narratives and myths.  He also 
includes, in a narrow sense, technologies such as statistical handbooks, maps, land-measuring 
tools, and population control measures (Elden, 2013, p. 322). 
Such practices create, sustain, and change borders; borders are created through these 
practices and these practices become meaningful because of the borders they create. Thus, 
the repertoire of bordering and territoriality is wide. The matter particular to this empirical 
analysis is to determine which practices and technologies are chosen, and analyse how they 
are chosen, and how they function. 
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2. INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF STATEHOOD 
International recognition is crucial in the fight for statehood. Without international recognition, 
it is impossible for a territorial entity to participate in contemporary international political 
processes. Only after achieving this recognition can states have diplomatic and economic 
relations with other states, become members in international organisations, and sign treaties. 
The main features of statehood in international relations are defined in the Montevideo 
Convention on Rights and Duties of States of 1933 and have become part of the customary 
international law. The first article of the Montevideo Convention declares that a state should 
have: “a) a permanent population; b) a defined territory; c) government; and d) capacity to 
enter into relations with the other states” (Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 1933). 
Some authors interpret the last characteristic – a capacity to form relations – as related 
to international recognition despite the fact that this is far from obvious or necessary, and 
usually entails the legal capacity to have relations (Warbrick, 2006, p. 229). Furthermore, the 
third article of the Montevideo Convention states that “[the] political existence of the state is 
independent of recognition by the other states” (Convention on Rights and Duties of States, 
1933). This means, that formally, according to this international treaty, the existence of a state 
does not depend on its capacity to enter into relationships with other states. 
Theoretical discussions in international law also reflect this inconclusiveness. They focus 
on the question of whether, when a new state appears, it should be recognised because it has 
all of the necessary substantive features of statehood or whether the new state’s decision to 
recognise itself defines the creation of a new state (Agné et al., 2013, p. 95). The first situation 
is referred to as declaratory, and the second constitutive. According to the declarative theory, 
recognition in and of itself does not have any imperative on the statehood of a particular state. 
A state is recognised when it has everything it needs to be treated as such (Warbrick, 2006, p. 
249). According to the constitutive theory, recognition is a procedure through which the state 
becomes a state. Without recognition, the state does not exist as the rights and obligations of 
states belong to the internationally recognised entities (Agné et al., 2013, p. 97). At first glance, 
this criterion appears simple and clear, but upon closer examination, it becomes far from clear. 
Theorists and analysts can always ask, how much recognition is enough? For example, Scott Pegg 
defines the following criteria for statehood recognition and has ranked them by importance. 
He specifies the necessity for a state to be recognized by: 1) great powers; 2) a patron state; 
3) neighbouring states; and 4) a majority of UN members; and 5) international organizations 
as indicated by acceptance of the state’s participation in international organisations (Francis, 
2011, p. 38). Thus, the recognition of a new state is usually partial and gradual. 
Attempting to choose between two theories of international recognition is futile. The 
problem is not in determining which theory is correct and should be applied or combined 
with another theory. The problem lies in the fact that in the practice of international relations, 
recognition is granted for a variety of different reasons, and most of the time, these reasons 
are not legal, but political.
Contemporary practices of international recognition during the last two hundred years 
have been developing within the context of the principle of national self-determination. 
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Initially, (from 1815 to 1945), this principle was formulated as a negative right: it was enough 
to acknowledge the de facto statehood of certain group of people who effectively control an 
entity. States were recognised according to this rule in Central and South America, Western 
Europe, and the Balkans in the nineteenth century, and in Central and Eastern Europe after the 
First World War (Fabry, 2012, p. 663).
In the mid-twentieth century international recognition practices changed; and ever since, 
internal sovereignty is no longer enough. Since the 1950s, the decisive factor in state recognition 
evolved from determining de facto independence, to determining whether an entity has the 
right to declare statehood (Fabry, 2010, p. 12). The reason for this change was the universal 
condemnation of colonialism and the decolonization process. The Declaration on the Granting 
of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted in 1960, states that “all peoples 
have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development” (United Nations, 
1960). The resolution also indicated which peoples have a right to declare statehood: non-
self-governing and trust territories held this right, regardless of whether they had a nominal 
government (Fabry, 2013, p. 167). 
However, recognition in non-colonial contexts can occur only with the agreement of the 
state from which it is separating. Otherwise, the principle of the territorial integrity of the 
state should be respected. Thus, in a non-colonial situation, a new state can emerge only 
with agreement from the state from which it is separating; a condition that is very difficult to 
satisfy. Malaysia allowed Singapore to leave in 1965. Bangladesh managed to separate in 1971, 
and in 1993—after three decades of civil war—Ethiopia let Eritrea organise an independence 
referendum. South Sudan, which appeared on the political map in 2011, also emerged as a 
state only after reaching an agreement with the central government in Sudan. In other cases, 
would-be states seeking independence managed to live separately but found themselves in 
ambiguous situations. 
The end of the cold war did not change these norms. Only after the obvious collapse of 
the Soviet Union in 1991 did the absolute majority of world states start to recognise former 
Soviet republics as sovereign states. The collapse of Yugoslavia developed according to this 
norm as well. 
Erika Leonaitė and Dainius Žalimas claim that international law is silent on the right to 
separate, because “there is no sufficient ground for admitting the existence of the right to 
secession in international law; on the other hand, international law does not, in principle, 
prohibit the unilateral declaration of independence, either” (2016, p. 25). Leonaitė and Žalimas 
also note that international law “stands clearly on the side of central governments, which enjoy 
the right to take any legal measures to defend the territorial integrity of their state” (2016, p. 
25). Thus territorial integrity remains a main principle. Without the agreement of the existing 
state from which the separation should take place, it is (almost) impossible to be recognised 
as a subject of international politics. 
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3. BORDERISATION IN GEORGIA
Upon declared its independence on April 9, 1991, Georgia controlled two autonomous regions—
Abkhazia (an autonomous republic) and South Ossetia (an autonomous region)—but only for 
a very short time. Separatist movements and interethnic tensions in these regions had already 
emerged before the fall of the Soviet Union. Very after the former USSR’s collapse, these tensions 
evolved into civil, ethnic, and separatist wars (Zürcher, 2007).  Since the Georgian-Russian war 
of August 2008, Georgia has decisively lost control of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both have 
been recognised by Russia and by several small states.  Both signed agreements with Russia in 
2009 to cooperatively guard their borders. 
Since 2009, both separatist entities began to limit and control the movement of people in 
and out of their territories, issue their own internal travel documents, and implement their 
own rules and regulations (Artman, 2013). However, it was not until 2013 that the process 
of establishing stricter territorial control began to take shape—in that year, the process of 
borderisation started in South Ossetia. Abkhazia followed with its own borderisation process a 
bit later. This also marked a new stage in Georgia’s relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In presenting the borderisation process in Georgia, which took place in 2013-2015, and its 
effects, I want to demonstrate how border building moves Abkhazia and South Ossetia towards 
the “territorial trap” and how the actions of Georgia support and amplify this process. To do 
so, it is important to focus on the border technologies described above by noting which border 
technologies are used and by interpreting and evaluating them in light of traditional political 
territoriality.
The empirical data for this research was gathered in the spring and summer of 2015 in 
Georgia. The research was based on: 1) expert interviews; 2) interviews with Georgian policy 
makers; 3) interviews with the staff of the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM); and 
4) two trips to Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s respective ABLs (administrative boundary lines).
The word borderisation is used to describe the building of a border in the territories of 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia to clearly and absolutely separate from Georgia. This process 
encompasses the control of the movement of people and commodities by creating a physical 
barrier, placing demarcation signs, installing surveillance equipment, and patrolling and 
strictly controlling border-crossing points. This border building started in August of 2013 in 
South Ossetia and in early 2014 in Abkhazia; and both continued their border construction 
processes until mid-2015. The visual result of this process is an approximately fifty-kilometre 
long physical border in South Ossetia and approximately twenty kilometres of a similar 
border in Abkhazia. 
Later, other borderisation activities were pursued: bases for border guards were refurbished 
or newly built. Mostly Russian border guards work in these bases and observation posts. 
Visually, one can see more and more border signs with the phrases such as, “You are entering 
the territory of the Republic of South Ossetia” (written in Russian and Ossetian) or “Republic 
of Abkhazia.” EUMM (European Union Monitoring Mission) staff calculated that some 200 
signs have been posted along a perimeter of South Ossetia spanning not longer than seventy 
to eighty kilometres.
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Together, these actions and facts clearly indicate that both separatist territories are 
establishing all the necessary signs of their independence. Of course, one could question the 
presence of the Russian military and Russian border guards there, but legally Russians are 
only providing “help” until the territories gain sufficient resources to secure their borders 
independently (e.g. “Соглашение между Российской Федерацией и Республикой Абхазия 
о совместных усилиях в охране государственной границы Республики Абхазия,” 2009). It 
should be noted and emphasised however, that the Russian border guards serve as the main 
security actors on the grounds bordering Georgian-controlled territory. There are at least 
nineteen border guard bases in each territory; some of these bases are equipped to provide 
shelter and safety in the event of a military ambush.
Another important tried-and-tested territorial technique is mapping. Maps are an important 
tool for imposing a particular order and vision on a territory, mapping also creates distance from 
a territory and makes a territory an abstraction while also presenting the territory, as a whole, 
as an existing entity (Crampton, 2009). Maps also have an objectifying effect. As maps are based 
on calculations and previously drawn lines, they can be considered truth—“maps don’t lie.” 
For Abkhazia and South Ossetia, deciding where to draw a border line was not self-evident. 
After the 2008 war, the EUMM in Georgia was established and had to determine the territory 
of its mission, they were not allowed to go into Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Thus, they needed 
some direction, they needed a map. The EUMM uses a 1984 Soviet military map (1:50 000) and 
administrative Georgian maps based on this 1984 Soviet military map. This map also proved 
useful when borderisation processes started as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Russia also rely 
on the lines from this map (IDFI, 2015; РЕС, 2013). Thus, in some sense, it is possible to say 
that two separatist entities were “on the map” much earlier than they began to exist as such. 
EUMM and Georgian officials are very careful not to use the term border when referring to 
the emerging borders between Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia in their communications 
and depictions of the situation. EUMM calls the line dividing the Georgian-controlled territory 
(which it also sometimes refers to as Tbilisi-controlled territory) from the territories Georgia 
does not control an administrative boundary line (ABL). Georgians have their own term: the 
dividing line, which is used in official documents (Parliament of Georgia, 2008), and the term 
occupation line is used in political statements and media (Agenda.ge, 2017a). This last term 
reveals how Georgia is trying to redefine the domestic conflict as a conflict between Georgia and 
Russia (Jakniūnaitė, 2017, pp. 153–157). Although the EUMM and Georgia are demonstrating 
an effort to avoid declaring the separation and distinctiveness of the two separatist regions, 
on a practical level, Georgia, together with the EUMM, is actually contributing to the growing 
separation between the Russian-backed territories and Georgia.
The on-going borderisation also affects the movement of the populations in these territories, 
it particularly impacts the daily habits, and practices of these populations. Affected populations 
have had to adjust to new border-crossing rules, due to the fact that the emerging border has 
separated some villages into two.  For these people, the concept of “illegal border crossing” 
has become meaningful. There are a few border-crossing points, but the authorities are trying 
to diminish their number (Agenda.ge, 2017b). 
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The Georgian-controlled sides of these borders do not have any border-crossing posts as 
Georgia does not consider the border to be legitimate and still regards the territories of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia as integral parts of Georgia. So, in Georgia’s conception of its territory, 
acknowledging border-crossing points in the middle of its sovereign territory would be akin to 
surrendering to the separatist entities. Nevertheless, it difficult not to notice that the hindrances 
exist. The goal of authorities is simple: to control, to the greatest degree possible, who gets in 
and gets out. But crossing checkpoints also have a signalling function—they announce entrance 
into a territory with clearly defined boundaries. Border-crossing checkpoints signal the presence 
of the state and make the state tangible, material, and felt. 
Thus, the building of a “state border” is a clear sign of and a loud message regarding 
sovereignty. Abkhazia and South Ossetia successfully employ the techniques of limiting 
residents’ contact with the Georgian population and forcing their populations—especially ethnic 
Georgians—living in the separatist territories, to choose sides. Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
are both trying to build and strengthen obvious signs of being a sovereign state. Though they 
are not able to gain international recognition, they are playing an imitation game, the goal of 
which is to create the habits and practices of living within their desired borders and they are 
making their practices a familiarity.
“Traditional” state borders separating Abkhazia and South Ossetia from Georgia appeared 
only in the last few years, however, divisions and different forms of borders have been present 
in these regions for a long time. This last stage of bordering has symbolic power: it physically 
confirms a separation that has been widening since the start of the conflict. The separation of 
the two territories from Georgia has occurred gradually, and the emerging physicality of the 
borders has served as a visual confirmation of an on-going processes. Physical borders help to 
erase the relativity of some spaces and provide the territories with a clear form—a wire fence, 
it appears, was the best way to loudly declare this form. The separation, however, was not and 
is not a one-way process. The ongoing conflict is occcurring in Georgia, and Georgia—whether 
it wants to or not—must participate in this situation.  In the next part of this article, I analyse 
Georgia’s decisions and actions regarding the borderisation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and 
the ensuing consequences of these decisions and actions.
4. NON-RECOGNITION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
Although Georgia gained independence in 1991, the country has still not finished defining 
its territorial structure. Above, I explored how Abkhazia and South Ossetia are creating their 
territorial separation. Here, I focus on Georgia’s reaction to the aforementioned process and 
its effects. 
The main thesis Georgian politicians emphasise is the principle of international law regarding 
the territorial integrity of a state. As previously stated, separatism in modern international 
relations, and in the non-colonial context, is possible only with the agreement of the main 
state. Thus, for Georgia, any status negotiations with the two separatist territories have to be 
about their status within the state of Georgia. Any other option is inconceivable in Georgia’s 
political discourse. So, the government of Georgia is not directly involved in any of the bordering 
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processes happening in its territory, nor does it acknowledge them as border practices. On 
the “Georgian” side of the ABLs between the two separatist territories there are no signs of 
border control. The  Special Tasks Department of Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia—a 
special police unit—observes the situation, but does not stop people from moving in or out of 
Abkhazia or South Ossetia’s claimed territories. In some sense, Georgia does not (want to) see 
the line that has evolved into a border. 
During the early stages of its rhetorical fights with separatist territories, one strategy Georgia 
employed was the attempt to create divisions within Abkhazia and South Ossetia’s populations. 
The populations in these regions, supposedly, did not actually want to be separated from 
Georgia, but were being manipulated by criminal and profit-seeking political elites within the 
two regions. Georgia’s president at the time, Mikheil Saakashvili, stated in his 2004 speech 
to the UN General Assembly, “the lawless territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are safe 
havens for mini-dictatorships, [and] tightly controlled by elite groups that seek to profit from the 
criminal status quo.” These groups, said Saakashvili, created “black holes and smugglers’ safe 
havens,” despite the people wanting to live peacefully and well (Saakashvili, 2004, pp. 13–15). 
The hope was that Georgia’s economic success would seduce the populations of Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia, attracting them to Georgia. This strategy of Saakashvili’s government, 
implemented from 2004 to 2008, was unsuccessful.  In fact the Saakashvili government had 
to quiet its critique of the local elites, as these entities were too small, too cohesive, and too 
interconnected for Georgia’s strategy to have any effect. 
Given that the physical border indisputably exists leaves Georgia’s government with little 
more than rhetorical devices to protest the bordering process and condemn it as immoral, 
illegal, and unjust. However, it would be unfair to say that Georgia has not developed policies 
regarding the separatist territories and their on-going borderisation practices.  But, as I will 
demonstrate next, Georgia’s policy of non-recognition, notwithstanding Georgia’s actions, 
contributes to the normalization of the borders or boundary lines between Georgia and South 
Ossetia and Georgia and Abkhazia. 
Georgia’s institutional conflict resolution policies clearly illustrate both a non-recognition 
principle and a refusal to give any subjectivity to the separatist entities. Until 2008, Georgia 
had  a State Ministry for Conflict Resolution Issues, but in 2008 the institution was renamed 
and became the State Ministry for Reintegration (Civil Georgia, 2013). This decision to rename 
was consistent with Saakshvili’s declarations and promises to unite the country and was greeted 
favourably in neither Abkhazia, nor South Ossetia; the underlying ambition was too obvious 
and too alienating. The renaming did send a message about Georgia’s territorial integrity and 
its perception of how to solve the conflict. Six years later, in 2014, the ministry was renamed 
again, becoming the State Ministry for Reconciliation and Civic Equality (Civil Georgia, 2014). 
This time, the renaming sent a new message: Georgia was willing to talk and wanted to prove 
that its engagement policy was not just a rhetorical device. This last decision, it seemed, did 
not influence the political elites of either Abkhazia or South Ossetia, it was made too late to 
have even some symbolic meaning. 
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So, the first feature of Georgia’s official stance regarding Abkhazia and South Ossetia is 
its reliance on the principle of territorial integrity. Therefore Georgia pursues absolutely not 
to recognize the territories. The second feature of this policy is Georgia’s position that these 
territories are occupied by Russia. For Georgia, Russia’s recognition of these entities is driving 
their borderisation processes (and there is unsupported data that Russia has financed much 
of the borderisation processes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Georgia holds that Russia 
has made Abkhazia and South Ossetia its puppet states. Georgia’s stance regarding Russia’s 
relationship with the separatist territories and Georgia’s approach towards Russia reveals itself 
in Georgia’s Law on Occupied Territories (Parliament of Georgia, 2008), adopted after the 2008 
Georgian-Russian war.  
There are three relevant aspects of this law. First, it reiterates Georgia’s main goal—
reintegration. Second, the law unequivocally defines the situation as a Russian occupation. 
Third, the law restrict movement into and within the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
The main restriction is a prohibition against economic activities in either region without written 
agreement from the government of Georgia. Furthermore, visitors may enter the territories 
only from the Georgian side; those who do not comply are subject to fines or imprisonment. 
The first version of the law even forbade representatives of the international humanitarian 
organisations and conflict resolution activities from entering the two regions from points that 
were not on the Georgian side. These restrictions, due to outside pressure were abrogated. 
Nevertheless, international humanitarian organisations must coordinate their activities within 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia with the government of Georgia. 
A difference between the territories and their inhabitants is inscribed into the law. According 
to Georgia, this conflict is an international conflict between Russia and Georgia. Thus, the people 
living in these two territories are victims, they are suffering Georgian citizens whom Georgia 
proposes to help. This reframing provides an explanation as to why Georgia does not speak 
with the political elites of the de facto states. Georgian is using this legal instrument to formally 
vocalise its protest against what it perceives as Russia’s illegitimate actions. 
The goal of these restrictions is to limit the functioning of the de facto states, and to 
prevent them from developing a capacity to rule that could lead to the de facto sovereignty 
and eventually increase or even justify the regions’ claims for international recognition. So, the 
solution Georgia chose was to pursue additional measures of territorial control, to define the 
special status of these territories, to underline their estrangement, and to limit the mobility 
of people residing in the two territories. The implementation of the law also makes the 
separateness and distinctiveness of these territories much greater and more tangible. 
Georgia’s rhetorical strategy of blaming Russia allows Georgia to reclassify the loss of the 
territories by blaming an external enemy. Now, the territorial conflicts are not about populations 
wanting to live separately, but about the self-determination of nations. The problem is presented 
as a problem caused by Russia, and with Russia tearing away parts of Georgia’s territory, Georgia 
is also a victim. 
Finally, Georgia pursued an engagement strategy that complemented its policy of non-
recognition, a strategy that was very difficult to realize. Engagement requires effort and goodwill 
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from all sides, yet neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia’s authorities were willing to demonstrate 
any desire to engage. Georgia’s official discourse also frequently mixed reintegration rhetoric 
with ideas of confidence building, a strategy that was strong on paper, but was never 
demonstrated in practice (see Government of Georgia, 2010). 
Thus these separatist and de facto state territories become more closed and more isolated. 
As a result, they have been forced to seek their viability from within and from anyone who 
wishes to support them. Thus Georgia has solved one problem, it is limiting the two territories’ 
possibilities for gaining international recognition; but in doing so Georgia is also supporting the 
estrangement and detachment of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by enacting its own territorial 
and bordering practices. 
As a side note, similar practice can be noticed in the actions of the EUMM, which tries as hard 
as it can, not to indicate any recognition of the separatist territories. The EUMM, as mentioned, 
uses the term ABL and the 1984 Soviet military maps.  It also instructs staff to comply with 
the same, or sometimes even stricter, recommendations regarding the behaviour at the line: 
not to come too close to it. Thus, even this simple fact demonstrates how it is difficult to act 
with regard to the line without recognising its subjectivity or acknowledging on-going border 
practices. Thus, it seems bordering is like dancing: it takes two, and even when one partner is 
unwilling, the dance is performed nevertheless. 
This paradoxical situation is possible because of the established broader practices mentioned 
previously—international politics is based on a territorial division of the world and on state 
bordering practices. So, Abkhazia and South Ossetia demonstrate their willingness both to 
be trapped by the modern territoriality and to be compliant subjects of this territorial world. 
All of the other players in this situation are already “trapped,” that is, they are participating 
in the sovereignty game and know the rules and practices through which either statehood 
or international agency (in the case of the EU) is supported and performed. Thus, for the 
contested territories in Georgia, performing the correct actions regularly—controlling the 
space and practicing borderisation—may lead to state formation, and in Georgia’s case, to a 
“smaller” state. But at the same time, everyone remains in the same ideological construction: 
a territorially-bounded stable nation-state idea. This is the answer Georgia has found. From 
Georgia’s perspective, the solution to the territorial conflict is to learn to live with a smaller 
territory. Indeed Georgia’s own actions strengthen its separation from Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. Effectively, patience and the time have stabilised the territorial changes, without the 
need to officially recognise them.
5. CONCLUSION
In analysing the creation of borders between Georgia and the de facto states of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia, I demonstrated how Georgia, even though it did not support the aims of the 
separatists of the two territories, was forced to participate in their on-going borderisation 
processes, processes that strengthened both the physical and mental separation of the 
territories from Georgia. Georgia incrementally adapted to losing these territories and to 
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perceiving itself as a smaller entity. Thus, we see at least one way in which territorial changes 
occurred in an already politically and territorially divided world. 
Of course territorial changes are not impossible, but this analysis demonstrates how it is 
possible to establish subjectivity from below, even without international recognition. Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia are both using established and tested state-bordering mechanisms and 
techniques, and the bureaucratic and administrative procedures of territorial control. In order 
to survive and subsist, people living on both sides of the ABL have to adjust to and find ways 
to negotiate the border. The border is now a daily fact with which they live, an entity that 
orders their lives. 
The effectiveness of Abkhazian and South Ossetia’s strategies lies in their ultimate goal: 
to become legitimate subjects of international politics. Through their shared strategy of 
normalisation, they seek to prove that they are traditional states with all the practices and 
institutions this status entails. The only significant aspect of statehood that they lack is 
international recognition, without international recognition the second best path to statehood 
is for them to trap themselves into state territorial practices. This involves not only controlling 
one’s own territory (in cases of separatism this happens first), but also includes the practice of 
establishing borders with strict border control to demonstrate their objective difference from the 
outside world. In the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia the foremost difference to be established 
is their difference from Georgia. To this also they add “container” thinking in that they assert 
an ideal overlapping of the territorial state and the society inhabiting their territory.  Thus, for 
example, the state of Abkhazia must to be created in order for Abkhaz society to have a vessel 
to live within. Now, there is no other way left to conceive territoriality—the container secures a 
collective group from threatening others and to be bound within another state is unimaginable.
Thus a stable situation without stability emerges. The bordering and territorial practices 
are recognisable and familiar; it is not difficult, with enough power and resources, to execute 
them properly. Therefore, it is not difficult to stabilise the situation, to make it sustainable and 
obvious. The analysed practices are so recognisable they do not need justification, which is 
exactly why they have been chosen. It is widely known that states (or “wanna-be” states) control 
their territories through border institutions, and this knowledge makes the process so efficient.
On the discursive level, Georgia’s government relies on politics of non-recognition, yet 
on the practical level, it normalizes the bordering practices of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
by legislating separation in punishing engagement with them and treating them as different. 
The border-crossing practices around the border or ABL are complex, they demand special 
knowledge. The signs of power are visible on both sides, so the categorization of people and 
territories also takes place. Georgia emphasises the spatial particularity and distinctiveness of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, much more than Georgians would like to acknowledge. 
Without being able to change the situation, Georgia must go along with it and accept the 
fact that it cannot destroy or erase the borders without creating another violent conflict, even 
though (rhetorically) Georgia’s politicians would never acknowledge this. So, Georgia accepts 
the existence of these borders by isolating the territories and not accepting that they are “state” 
borders, yet behaving as if they are state borders. 
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Thus, Georgia is learning to live without these territories.  In the meantime, Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia are performing their “statehood” in perpetual limbo. These stabilised but unstable 
situations demonstrate the tensions between practice and discourse. Thus, through spatial 
control and bordering practices it is possible both to practically live with the “smaller” state and 
remain in the fixed ideological framework of the territorial bound and unchanging nation state.
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